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Abstract
I study corporate risk management with property insurance in non-listed small and
medium sized ﬁrms. I document negative relations between various ownership measures
CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and insurance
use as well as a positive relation between the number of family owners and insurance use.
These relations are consistent with self-insurance among CEO-controlled ﬁrms, ﬁrms with
high ownership concentrations, ﬁrms with above average female owners and ﬁrms with a
small number of family owners, given monopolistic insurance premium pricing practices. In-
deed, I show that insurance premium and ﬁrm proﬁtability are positively related, implying
that insurers raise premium when ﬁrm proﬁtability soars or implying that proﬁtable ﬁrms
demand more coverage and other provisions. The above relations are also consistent with
stakeholders stipulating less insurance the higher the CEO salary or the higher the ownership
concentration, precisely because these ﬁrm characteristics proxy inversely for ﬁrm risk. This
view is supported by negative relations between these ownership variables and the coeﬃ-
cient of variation of revenues. Further, I provide evidence of strong causal relations between
insurance use, leverage and liquidity. Speciﬁcally, insurance use and liquidity are risk man-
agement complements since insurance use exerts a positive inﬂuence on corporate liquidity
and liquidity exerts a positive inﬂuence on insurance use. Finally, ownership concentration
and aggregate female ownership show positive relations with liquidity which is consistent
with risk aversion motivated hedges.
Keywords: Corporate Risk Management; Leverage; Liquidity; Property Insurance; Non-
Listed Firms
JEL Classiﬁcation: G22; G32; G33; G35
1 Introduction
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence of a strong negative relation between ownership
variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and cor-
porate property insurance use, thereby rejecting the hypothesis that managers' and owners'
risk aversion provide incentives to increase corporate hedging policies. One plausible interpre-
tation of these relations is that insurers possess and exercise market power, hence corporate
hedging with insurance is decreasing in managerial and owners risk aversion. Employing a
simultaneous-equations model that recognizes the simultaneity of insurance use, leverage and
liquidity shows, among other things, that insurance use and liquidity are risk management
complements. Ownership variables show positive relations with liquidity, hereby supporting
the hypothesis that managers' and owners' risk aversion provide incentives to implement and
to extend corporate hedging policies.
Small and medium-sized ﬁrms are most sensitive to changes in exchange rate, interest
rate, and other shocks such as catastrophic events. Despite the fact that one single event can
wipe out a small business and, thus, small ﬁrms have stronger incentives, generally, to hedge
than large ﬁrms, empirical work on corporate risk management has basically overlooked
small ﬁrms. In addition, nearly all of the empirical literature on corporate risk management
focuses on derivative use. However, small or private ﬁrms are not signiﬁcant users of deriva-
tives. Speciﬁcally, insurance use data oﬀers one crucial advantage over derivative use data,
namely, that exposures and the extent of hedging are easy to measure. Therefore, in this
study, I exploit a unique database from an international insurance broker on property insur-
ance purchases by small and medium-sized private Norwegian ﬁrms to study insurance use.1
According to the accounting data, the average value of the insured assets is forty percent of
the total assets. As a result, risk management with insurance is signiﬁcant to the survival
1Accounting as well as ownership data from Scandinavia have received increased attention recently. See
for example Bennedsen et al. (2007) employing data from Denmark, Sundgren and Wells (1998) studying
Finnish ﬁrms, and Thorburn (2000) using data from Sweden. Signiﬁcantly, in Norway, all limited liability
ﬁrms, listed and non-listed, face an identical accounting and reporting environment. For further information
on the nature of the accounting and ownership data employed in this study, see Berzins et al. (2008).
of the ﬁrms in my sample.
An important empirical question is whether managers' and owners' risk aversion (Amihud
and Lev (1981), Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985)), provide incentives to implement
corporate hedging policies. The risk aversion hypothesis implies that ownership variables
and the extent of hedging or insurance use are positively related. However, the empirical
evidence on the risk aversion hypothesis is mixed. Mayers and Smith (1982), for example,
argue that risk aversion cannot explain insurance demand by corporations. Unlike in public
ﬁrms, owners of small and medium sized ﬁrms have, in general, tied their wealth to the
ﬁrm. In addition, family ﬁrms stress survival and the welfare of stakeholders as important
concerns and, thus, need to engage in risk management. Another hypothesis is, therefore,
that the positive relation between ownership variables and the extent of insurance use is
stronger or more relevant for non-listed ﬁrms. I, however, provide empirical evidence of a
strong negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration
and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use.2 These relations
are inconsistent with the risk aversion hypothesis. I also provide empirical evidence of a
positive relation between the number of family owners and insurance use. This relation is
also inconsistent with the risk aversion hypothesis since the risk aversion motive is expected
to diminish in importance as the number of owners increases. Importantly, one cannot
attribute these relations to an unobservable adverse private ﬁrm eﬀect or to some peculiarity
of Norwegian corporations since Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008), employing data on U.S.
public ﬁrms, also ﬁnd negative relations between managerial ownership and 5% block owners
and property insurance coverage.
The above relations between ownership variables and insurance use are consistent with
over-insuring by ﬁrms with low or below average CEO salary and ownership variables, as well
as with self-insurance among CEO or family controlled ﬁrms, given monopolistic insurance
premium pricing practices. There exists anecdotal as well as empirical evidence on insurers
2CEO ownership also shows a negative relation with insurance use. Because CEO ownership substantially
reduces the sample size, it is excluded from the main analysis.
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possessing and exercising market power. Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008), for example, ob-
serve increases in property insurance premiums up to 300% within one year. Notably, Dafny
(2008) documents that health insurers charge higher premiums to more proﬁtable ﬁrms. In
my sample, I ﬁnd that in a regression of changes in premium on a constant, changes in
proﬁtability, changes in property plus year and industry dummy variables, changes in prof-
itability show a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient. This relation implies that the insurers raise
property premiums to ﬁrms that experience an increase in proﬁts or that proﬁtable ﬁrms
raise coverage.
The above relations are also consistent with stakeholders stipulating less insurance the
higher the CEO salary or the higher ownership concentration, precisely because exposure
to ﬁrm risk via salary or via ownership proxy inversely for ﬁrm risk.3 Indeed, I show that
in a regression of the coeﬃcient of variation of revenues on a constant, industry dummy
variables, the ﬁrm mean of ownership concentration and the ﬁrm mean of CEO salary,
ownership concentration and CEO salary show a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient, implying
that ﬁrms with high ownership variables are less risky.
I analyze insurance use, leverage and liquidity jointly by employing simultaneous-equation
regressions. This is an important matter because hedging, or insuring, may allow ﬁrms
to increase debt capacity. Further, debt contracts frequently stipulate levels of insurance
coverage, Smith (1995). First, non-listed ﬁrms insure (hedge), as do listed ﬁrms, to increase
their debt capacity. For the ﬁrms in my sample, it is also true that the debt ratio exerts
a positive inﬂuence on insurance use. This illustrates that non-listed ﬁrms do not diﬀer
from public ﬁrms in this respect (Graham and Rogers (2002) and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling
(2008)). Second, I ﬁnd that insurance use exerts a positive inﬂuence on corporate liquidity.
I also ﬁnd the converse, that corporate liquidity exerts a positive inﬂuence on insurance use.
This is the ﬁrst evidence that insurance and liquidity, both forms of active risk management,
3These relations are also consistent with a lack of incentive for CEOs and owners with large ownership
interests to hedge states with too low cash ﬂow. However, it appears challenging to provide empirical evidence
to support this scenario.
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are complements. The view that cash and insurance are complements is supported by Rochet
and Villeneuve (2008) who ﬁnd, in a model where the ﬁrm's liquidity management interacts
with Brownian risk (hedged with derivatives) and with Poisson risk (hedged with insurance),
that cash-poor ﬁrms should not insure whereas cash-rich ﬁrms should insure. Third, although
insurance and liquidity are complements, ﬁrms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity.
Liquidity exerts a negative inﬂuence on long-term debt and long-term debt exerts a negative
inﬂuence on liquidity. Hence, long-term debt and liquidity are substitutes.
The last two points are related to Acharya et al. (2007) who argue that cash is held as a
hedging instrument rather than as negative debt by ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. They show
theoretically and provide empirical evidence supporting the theory that constrained
ﬁrms with high hedging needs prefer higher cash to lower debt, but ﬁrms with low hedging
needs prefer lower debt to higher cash. Although the aims of this paper diﬀer from the
ones in Acharya et al. (2007), I nevertheless ﬁnd that cash serves two purposes: it is a
hedging instrument (complement with insurance), but may also be interpreted as negative
debt (substitute for long-term debt). The latter view is supported by Opler et al. (1999)
who show that ﬁrm characteristics known to be empirically associated with low debt are also
associated with high cash.
To the extent that insurance use, leverage and liquidity are simultaneously determined,
these ﬁrm policies are likely to be aﬀected by the same variables. Accordingly, it is possible
that managerial and owners risk aversion motives matter for leverage and liquidity. Indeed,
I ﬁnd that ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership show positive relations
with liquidity, which is consistent with a risk aversion motivated hedge.
The empirical methods used help reduce potential simultaneous-equations bias. In one
extension, I employ forecasted ﬁrm characteristics rather than prior values for the explana-
tory variables. This is an important matter as all explanatory variables are at least partially
endogenous. Overall, I ﬁnd that the results of the paper are robust to this extension as well
as to various other robustness checks.
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The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 contains a brief literature review. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 contains the main empirical analysis. Section 5 contains empir-
ical evidence that explains the negative relation between ownership variables and insurance
use. Section 6 contains robustness checks, and conclusions are provided in Section 7. Ap-
pendix A provides a detailed description of the data, Appendix B contains sign predictions,
while Appendix C brieﬂy describes the data forecasting method.
2 Literature Review
This paper is related to four strands of research and aims at complementing and extending
previous works by focusing on private ﬁrms and by employing ownership variables such as
aggregate female ownership or number of family owners. To my knowledge, none of the
papers in the corporate risk management literature treat liquidity as an endogenous variable
that interplays with derivative use, insurance use, or leverage. I also extend the literature
by providing evidence of a relation between ownership variables and liquidity.
In the derivative use literature, Tufano (1996), Schrand and Unal (1998) and Graham
and Rogers (2002), ﬁnd that hedging increases with managerial ownership. Studies that fail
to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between managerial risk aversion and hedging with derivatives
include Gezcy et al. (1997), Haushalter (2000) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001). Although
Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (2000) ﬁnd that hedging is decreasing in managerial option
ownership, it has been argued, Rogers (2002), that the lack of evidence for the risk aversion
motive may be a result of poor proxy variables for executive option holdings. Assuming
that managerial compensation schemes are jointly determined enables Coles et al. (2006)
to show that option delta and vega aﬀect ﬁrm policy. On the one hand, these ﬁndings
suggest that the overall evidence for the risk aversion motive driven by equity exposure is, at
best, weak. On the other hand, managerial risk aversion does seem to aﬀect ﬁrms' policies,
including hedging with derivatives, when managers hold executive options. Note, however,
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that executive options are not included in my data.
Another smaller strand of the literature studies corporate risk management with insur-
ance (Mayers and Smith (1982), Mayers and Smith (1987), Mayers and Smith (1990), Yamori
(1999), Hoyt and Kang (2000), Zou et al. (2003) and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)).
Within this strand, only Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) analyze managerial ownership, in-
stitutional ownership and block-owners' inﬂuence on corporate insurance use. They report,
consistent with the results presented in this paper, negative relations between block owners
and insurance coverage and between managerial ownership and insurance coverage.
To my knowledge, only Vickery (2008) studies risk management practices in non-listed
ﬁrms by investigating how these ﬁrms adjust their interest rate exposure via ﬁxed-rate or
variable-rate loans. He provides evidence for why ﬁrms engage in risk management through
standard arguments, such as due to ﬁnancial constraints, and draws on two surveys. Accord-
ing to this study, owners do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the risk management decision.
Speciﬁcally, Vickery (2008) employs, among other ownership-related variables, the owner's
age and the concentration of ownership, but ﬁnds no relation. The only evidence supporting
the risk aversion motive is that adjustable-rate loans are more common among ﬁrms with
wealthier owners, which is consistent with the notion that risk aversion is declining with
increased wealth.
This paper is also related to the growing literature on corporate liquidity. Recent con-
tributions include Bates et al. (2008) who show that cash ratios increase over time because
cash ﬂows of ﬁrms become riskier and because ﬁrms change, as well as Lins et al. (2008), who
show that ﬁrms hold more cash in countries with greater agency problems. Other notable
papers addressing corporate liquidity include Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Dittmar
et al. (2003), Almeida et al. (2004) and Faulkender and Wang (2006).
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3 The Data
The insurance data are property insurance contracts of Norwegian non-listed limited liabil-
ity ﬁrms obtained from Aon Grieg, an international insurance broker. Business interruption
contracts are separately available and I therefore exclude these contracts from the analysis.
The original panel data set contains more than 1,653 ﬁrm-year observations, ranging from
January, 2003 through May, 2006. The Aon database contains a few publicly-listed compa-
nies, but the vast majority of the data is for non-listed ﬁrms. Therefore, I focus attention on
non-listed ﬁrms. To be included in the analysis, each insurance observation is matched with
accounting data from the CCGR database, which is based on data from CreditInform,4 when
available.5 An account of the selection and matching procedure is provided in Appendix A.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of sample ﬁrm's property insurance premium
data. Premium is the annual insurance premium in Norwegian Kroner (NOK). The ﬁnal
sample contains insurance premiums for 933 ﬁrms with 1,855 ﬁrm-year observations. The
mean (median) for the insurance premium is NOK 192,432 (45,848).6 The data show wide
variation (across ﬁrms and to a lesser extent over time) as evidenced by the diﬀerence between
the minimum (164) and maximum (15,281,813) observation. Firms with positive long-term
debt ratio show a mean (median) for the insurance premium of 242,512.60 (68,770) while
ﬁrms with no long-term debt show a mean (median) for the insurance premium of 127,210.70
(29,240.50). Although ﬁrms with positive long-term debt ratio show a substantially higher
mean and median premium as well as lower skew in premium than ﬁrms with no long-term
debt, both group of ﬁrms exhibit a similar wide variation in premiums.
I follow Mayers and Smith (1982), Mayers and Smith (1987), Mayers and Smith (1990),
Yamori (1999), Hoyt and Kang (2000) and Zou et al. (2003) in interpreting the insurance
premium as a proxy for the extent of property coverage. Indeed, Aunon-Nerin and Ehling
4See www.creditinform.no.
5The accounting and ownership database are maintained at the Centre for Corporate Governance Research
(CCGR) at BI - The Norwegian School of Management. For additional information on the data, see Berzins
et al. (2008).
6EUR 1 = NOK 8.80 on 9 April 2009.
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(2008) argue that their results are practically unchanged when replacing coverage with pre-
mium. The analysis below also assumes that the leasing of property, which is unobservable,
does not systematically aﬀect insurance coverage and, in particular, the simultaneity between
cash, debt, and insurance.
Since ﬁrms diﬀer in their needs for property insurance, it is important to scale the pre-
mium with property, plant and equipment plus inventories (PP&E+I), which represents the
dependent variable employed in this study. Because of extreme outliers of the insurance
ratio, the smallest and largest one percent are excluded from the analysis and from Table 1.
See also Appendix A for further information regarding outliers.
Table 1 also contains the property insurance premium to dividends and the property
insurance premium to earnings ratio. Both measures suggest that corporate spending on
insurance premiums is economically signiﬁcant. The value of the insured assets is signif-
icant too as the mean of PP&E+I to total assets is greater than thirty percent, reaching
forty percent for the subsample with positive long-term debt ratio. This implies that risk
management with insurance must be signiﬁcant to the survival of these ﬁrms.
Table 1 also shows the descriptive statistics for two subsamples, namely ﬁrms with posi-
tive long-term debt and ﬁrms with zero long-term debt. Firms with zero long-term debt are
smaller (not reported) and pay smaller insurance premium. Another diﬀerence between the
subsamples, namely the mean of the insurance ratio, which is statistically signiﬁcant, may
be interpreted as implying that ﬁrms with zero long-term debt purchase more insurance per
unit of property. This interpretation is plausible since most property insurance contracts
cover replacement costs: other ﬁrm characteristics, such as ﬁrm age or the average age of
property, are less likely to cause the higher insurance ratio for ﬁrms with zero long-term debt.
An alternative and also plausible interpretation is that insurers systematically discriminate
against smaller ﬁrms.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 reports the distribution of sample ﬁrms across industries and the number of
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observations over time. This table also reports the percent of ﬁrms with negative and positive
earnings as well as negative and positive equity. The industry classiﬁcations are Berzins et al.
(2008) classiﬁcations that diﬀer from standard Norwegian classiﬁcation codes. This one digit
industry classiﬁcation system relies on 8 industries instead of the standard approach using
10 industries.7 Firms that are active in multiple industries are assigned to the Multi Group.
Derivative use work excludes ﬁnancial ﬁrms from the analysis because hedging and sales of
derivatives are indistinguishable and because banks are regulated. Initially, I do not exclude
ﬁnancial ﬁrms since the ﬁrms in my sample do not engage in sales of insurance contracts. In
the regressions below, I always exclude the ﬁnancial industry dummy and the multi group
industry dummy since both have small sample size. In the end, ﬁnancial ﬁrms show several
missing sales data and are, thus, excluded from the reported regressions. Approximately one
third of the data are from the year 2004 and the year 2005. The remaining one third of the
ﬁrm-year observations are almost equally from years 2003 and 2006. The table also shows
that almost seven percent of the ﬁrm-year observations are from ﬁrms with negative equity.
Table 2 also reports characteristics for the subsamples of ﬁrms with positive long-term
debt and for ﬁrms with zero long-term debt. Overall, the two subsamples do not diﬀer
substantially on the reported ﬁrm characteristics of Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, me-
dian, and maximum) of the corporate accounting variables which, according to corporate
ﬁnance theory, motivate the purchase of insurance. I employ the following explanatory vari-
ables related to incentives for corporate insurance use. CASH is cash and equivalents divided
by assets. CEOSALARY is the CEO salary divided by assets times 1,000. CONCENTRA-
7Of the 1,618 ﬁrm-years for which the insurance ratio is available, 299 observations have a missing value
for the industry group variable. However, I note that, based on the data available for the period 1994-2006,
no ﬁrm appears to change the industry classiﬁcation code in my subsample of the population. Therefore, I
ﬁll in missing values with the industry code for the same ﬁrm if it is available for at least one year. This
results in only 6 cases with missing industry classiﬁcations for the sample of ﬁrms with available insurance
ratio.
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TION is the Herﬁndahl index of equity ownership.8 DIV is dividends scaled by total equity.
FAMILYSIZE is number of family owners of the largest family. LTD stands for the book
value of long-term debt divided by assets. FEMALE is aggregate female ownership divided
by 100. INSTOWN is institutional ownership divided by 100. INTANGASSETS is intan-
gible assets scaled by total assets. OPEX is operating expenses scaled by sales. PP&E is
property, plant, and equipment as a percentage of assets. ROA is the return on assets (oper-
ating earnings over assets). SALESGROWTH is the three-year moving average percentage
growth in sales. SALES is the logarithm of sales. SIZE stands for the logarithm of assets.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
One can see from Table 3 that ﬁrms with zero long-term debt substantially diﬀer from
ﬁrms with positive long-term debt. For instance, ﬁrms with zero long-term debt show a
higher mean for CASH, higher mean for CEOSALARY, higher mean for DIV, etc. These
diﬀerences between means are highly statistically signiﬁcant.
Because I rely on standard variables for the corporate ﬁnance incentives to hedge, or
insure, I do not elaborate on the proxies or their sign predictions, and refer the interested
reader to the Data Appendix and the literature (Nance et al. (1993), Gezcy et al. (1997),
Graham and Rogers (2002), Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)).
In previous versions of this paper, I employed various other standard risk management re-
lated variables. These variables, for example, number of employees, did not add explanatory
power to the regressions or represent yet another proxy, R&D versus SALES GROWTH, for
the same hedging motive. Results with alternative speciﬁcations are available upon request.9
Finally, untabulated correlation coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables, along with the
insurance ratio, are low, mostly insigniﬁcant, and thus suggest that colinearity problems will
8The ﬁndings presented below are robust to various other ways (percentage of the largest owner and
logarithm of the number of owners) of calculating ownership concentration.
9Variables excluded from the main analysis of the paper include: average family owner size, cash divided
by current liabilities, CEO is member of largest family owner, CEO ownership, chair is member of largest
family owner, convertible loans divided by the book value of assets, CreditInform debt rating divided by
100, debt equity ratio, direct ownership of all family owners, direct ownership of largest family, dividends
per share to earnings per share, logarithm of number of employees, number of seats of largest family owner,
regional dummy variables, ultimate ownership of all family owners and ultimate ownership of largest family.
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not aﬀect the regressions presented below. The only exception is the rather high correlation,
0.7, between SALES and SIZE. As I argue in Section 6, the high correlation between these
two ﬁrm characteristics raises the hurdle for ﬁnding robust evidence for the various hedging
theories and therefore does not drive my results.
4 Empirical Findings
This section studies whether corporate property insurance purchases of non-listed ﬁrms are
explained by standard proxies that aim at measuring corporate ﬁnance hedging motives.
Pearson correlation coeﬃcients, OLS regressions, and other regression models are untabu-
lated, but available upon request. I focus the discussion on results of linear GMM simulta-
neous equations with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent p-values.10 I further
focus on the insurance use regression and on the simultaneity between capital structure,
liquidity (CASH), and insurance. The identifying restrictions I impose should be clear from
Tables 4-6.
Many of the explanatory variables are at least partially endogenous. I control for simul-
taneity between the insurance ratio, liquidity, and capital structure. For exogenous variables,
the regressions below are based on lagged data to reduce potential simultaneous-equations
bias.
Table 4 presents the ﬁrst insights into the important question of whether ownership vari-
ables exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on insurance rates. The dependent variables are insurance
premium scaled by PP&E+I, LTD, and CASH. The LTD equation is motivated by Graham
and Rogers (2002) and the related literature, while the CASH equation is motivated by Bates
et al. (2008) and, to a lesser extent, by Lins et al. (2008).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
CEOSALARY, CONCENTRATION, and FEMALE show negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
10Regressions with a two-stage estimation technique, 2SLS, are qualitatively similar and available upon
request.
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cient estimates in the INSURANCE equation of Table 4. These results are inconsistent with
the risk aversion motive put forward in Amihud and Lev (1981), Stulz (1984) and Smith and
Stulz (1985).
The relation between the dividend yield and insurance use is negative and signiﬁcant.
This result complements the evidence in Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) on public ﬁrms.
They argue that if dividends and free cash ﬂow are positively related, then a ﬁrm with high
dividends is less likely to fail to rebuild when a casualty loss occurs. Their argument is consis-
tent with the evidence in Allen and Michaely (2003) that the greater part of total dividends
are paid by large and proﬁtable ﬁrms with low information asymmetry. The above relation is
also consistent with the view that if dividends are high, then the under-investment problem
is small due to the negative relation between dividends and the investment opportunity set
(Smith and Watts (1992)).
According to Grace and Rebello (1993), favorable information may be signaled through
a high level of insurance coverage and vice versa. DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1991), DeMarzo and
Duﬃe (1995) and Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) also provide models of informational
asymmetry that motivate hedging. Informational asymmetries are expected to be lower
for ﬁrms with high institutional ownership than for ﬁrms with low institutional ownership.
However, the empirical evidence for this hedging incentive is weak or even inconsistent with
the predictions. Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) ﬁnd no relation between institutional own-
ership and property insurance coverage. Purnanandam (2008) ﬁnds that derivative hedgers
have signiﬁcantly higher institutional shareholdings than non-hedgers. Further, Graham and
Rogers (2002) and Rogers (2002) ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relation between institutional
ownership and the extent of derivative hedging.
The negative relation between INSTOWN and INSURANCE, which is insigniﬁcant, in
Table 4 appears, at ﬁrst, to support the informational asymmetry hedging motive. However,
it is not clear to whom the ﬁrms may signal through insurance. Since non-listed ﬁrms
rarely attract outside investors, it is more likely that institutional investors either directly
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or indirectly inﬂuence the ﬁrms in my sample to reduce insurance.
To control for proﬁtability, I use ROA. In Table 4, ROA shows a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
estimate with negative sign, which is consistent with the sign of DIV. It is also consistent with
the view that high dividends imply greater free cash ﬂow and that dividends are typically
paid by proﬁtable ﬁrms.
SIZE shows predicted sign but is insigniﬁcant. This may be due to the rather small
variability of ﬁrm size in the data. Recall that the ﬁrms in the database need to reach a
certain size to justify an insurance broker. This excludes very small ﬁrms. Focusing on ﬁrms
with positive LTD also removes smaller ﬁrms. Since insurance data on listed ﬁrms is scarce in
my sample (and excluded from the analysis), many large ﬁrms were automatically excluded.
Hence, the nature of my data and the selection procedure implies limited cross-sectional
variation in ﬁrm size.
The variable SALESGROWTH, a proxy for growth options, shows a negative sign and
is insigniﬁcant. This hedging argument is based on the idea that it is optimal for ﬁrms
with growth options to reduce cash ﬂow variability. Note that Aunon-Nerin and Ehling
(2008) argue that insurance only aﬀects cash ﬂow variability indirectly, via the insurance
deductible. Since I use insurance premium, which proxies for insurance coverage rather
than for the insurance deductible, it appears that the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate for
SALESGROWTH is plausible.
The simultaneous-equation regressions setting allows for controlling for insurance use due
to debt demand. This is an important matter because hedging or insurance may allow ﬁrms
to increase debt capacity. Too, ﬁrms with high debt may be contracted with debtors to
insure. I provide the ﬁrst evidence into this important question for non-listed ﬁrms. Indeed,
non-listed ﬁrms insure (hedge), as suggested by Table 4, to increase their debt capacity.
For the ﬁrms in my sample, it is also true that the debt ratio exerts a positive inﬂuence
on insurance use. This shows that non-listed ﬁrms do not diﬀer from public ﬁrms in this
respect, Graham and Rogers (2002) and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008). Next, note that
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INSURANCE exerts a positive inﬂuence on corporate liquidity, CASH. Signiﬁcantly, I also
ﬁnd that the insurance-liquidity relation exists in reverse, in that CASH exerts a positive
inﬂuence on INSURANCE. This is the ﬁrst evidence that insurance and liquidity, both forms
of risk management, are complements. Although insurance and liquidity are complements,
ﬁrms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity. Table 4 shows that liquidity exerts a
negative inﬂuence on long-term debt, and that long-term debt exerts a negative inﬂuence on
liquidity. Therefore, long-term debt and liquidity behave as substitutes.
The view that liquidity serves two purposes, namely to hedge as well as to directly or
indirectly reduce debt, is consistent with Acharya et al. (2007). They argue that cash is held
as a hedging instrument rather than as negative debt by ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms with
high hedging needs.
Next, I turn to the LTD and CASH regression results in Table 4. The coeﬃcient esti-
mates in the LTD equation, in Table 4, are consistent with the results in Graham and Rogers
(2002) with the exception of SALESGROWTH. Graham and Rogers (2002) employ R&D
expenditure as a proxy for growth options and report a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient esti-
mate. I, however, document a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient estimate for sales growth. The
coeﬃcient estimates in the CASH regression are also consistent with the ﬁndings reported
in Bates et al. (2008). Note, however, that Bates et al. (2008) make their prediction for a
dividend payout dummy and, thus, their results cannot be directly compared to the results
reported in Table 4. DIV, in Table 4, is highly signiﬁcant and shows a positive sign whereas
Bates et al. (2008) predict and ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient for the dividend payout dummy
variable.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
To the extent that insurance use, leverage and liquidity are simultaneously determined,
these ﬁrm policies are likely to be aﬀected by the same explanatory variables. Speciﬁcally,
what is the inﬂuence of managerial and owners' risk aversion for leverage and liquidity? The
simultaneous-equation regression model in Table 5 re-estimates the model in Table 4 using
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CONCENTRATION and FEMALE also in the LTD and in the CASH equation.
In Table 5, the coeﬃcients yield slightly diﬀerent results in signiﬁcance in comparison
to those obtained in Table 4. CEOSAL is now insigniﬁcant and INSTOWN is only slightly
insigniﬁcant, whereas in Table 4, INSTOWN shows a p-value of 0.22 in the INSURANCE
regression. In the LTD regression, there is almost no change in signiﬁcance in comparison
to those obtained in Table 4, except that the p-value of OPEX drops from 0.14 to 0.11. The
coeﬃcients in the CASH regression of Table 5 yield identical results in signiﬁcance in compar-
ison to those obtained in Table 4. Note also that there is not one single sign change in Table
5 relative to Table 4. Interestingly, CONCENTRATION and FEMALE show positive rela-
tions with LTD although CONCENTRATION is insigniﬁcant and, as well, positive relations
with CASH. The latter relations are consistent with a risk aversion motivated hedge.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Next, I study the inﬂuence of family ownership variables. The CCGR database contains
any family's involvement in a ﬁrm's ownership. The involvement is classiﬁed as a pair in terms
of a basic family relation type as of the year-end 2007. These types are parents, grandparents,
great-grandparents, great-great-grandparents and marriage. Based on these nuclear family
types, 18 types of family relations between two individuals, including relationships like sisters,
cousins, uncle/aunt and nephew/niece are included in the database.
Various family ownership variables including ultimate ownership of all family owners
and ultimate ownership of largest family show no relations with INSURANCE. The only
exception is the number of owners in the largest family. In Table 6, the coeﬃcients yield
again slightly diﬀerent results in signiﬁcance in comparison to those obtained in Table 4 and
Table 5. Overall, the previous results appear robust. The risk aversion hypothesis for owners
is expected to become less important when the number of owners increases. FAMILYSIZE,
however, shows a signiﬁcantly positive relation with INSURANCE. This result underscores
the coeﬃcient estimates of CONCENTRATION and FEMALE, which also show unexpected
sign. Further, FAMILYSIZE shows signiﬁcantly negative relation with CASH, which is
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consistent with a risk aversion motivated hedge.
To sum up, the empirical results suggest that corporate insurance use is aﬀected, and
quite signiﬁcantly so, by ownership structure and the CEO's private motives. In addition,
non-listed ﬁrms insure to increase their long-term debt capacity; insurance and liquidity are
complements; and liquidity and long-term debt are substitutes.
5 Explaining the Negative Relation between Ownership
Variables and Insurance
In this section, I present two pieces of empirical evidence that may explain the strong negative
relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate
female ownership and corporate property insurance use.
Dafny (2008) argues that health insurers exploit more proﬁtable ﬁrms. If this is also a
common practice in the property insurance industry, then, on the one hand, it is conceivable
that ﬁrms with low CEO salary, low ownership concentration, low female ownership or a
general high dispersion of ownership ignore or even facilitate monopolistic insurance premium
pricing practices. On the other hand, ﬁrms with high levels of ownership concentration, in
one way or another, probably respond to overpriced insurance contracts by cutting back on
coverage and thus also on premium. Obviously, the motive to cut back on coverage may be
stronger than the risk aversion hedging motive, which then explains the negative relation.
Results in Panel A of Table 7 support the view that insurers exploit more proﬁtable ﬁrms.
The table contains regressions of changes in premium on a constant, changes in proﬁtability,
lagged changes in proﬁtability, changes in PP&E+I and lagged changes in PP&E+I plus year
and industry dummy variables. Changes in proﬁtability, lagged changes in proﬁtability or
both show signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients, implying that insurers raise property premiums
to ﬁrms that experience an increase in proﬁts.
Of course, an alternative interpretation, which I cannot rule out, is that proﬁtable ﬁrms
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raise coverage or incorporate other, potentially expensive provisions, into their property
insurance contracts. Importantly, both interpretations help explain why I ﬁnd a strong
negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and
aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use. In any case, if proﬁtable
ﬁrms do raise coverage, this practice would be less common among ﬁrms with high ownership
concentration.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Consider that the risk aversion motive is valid. Then, it natural to assume that managers
and owners are keen to not only hedge cash ﬂow risk and other sources of risk but also to
fundamentally reduce ﬁrm risk. If ﬁrms with high ownership concentration are indeed less
risky, then hedging is needed to a lesser extent. Further, if high CEO salary or high ownership
concentration proxy inversely for ﬁrm risk, then stakeholders may respond by stipulating less
insurance.
Panel B of Table 7 contains regressions of the coeﬃcient of variation of ﬁrm revenues on a
constant, ﬁrm mean of CEO salary (MEANCEOSAL), ﬁrm mean of ownership concentration
(MEANCONCENTRATION) and ﬁrm mean of institutional ownership (MEANINSTOWN)
plus industry dummy variables.11 MEANCEOSAL shows negative coeﬃcient estimates but
is always slightly insigniﬁcant. MEANCONCENTRATION shows a signiﬁcantly negative
coeﬃcient, implying that ﬁrms with high ownership concentration are less risky. Coeﬃ-
cient estimates of MEANINSTOWN are insigniﬁcant and appear only in one out of three
regressions with negative sign.
Overall, the evidence in Table 7 supports the view that managers' and owners' risk
aversion matter. The negative relation between ownership variables and insurance use may
be due to monopolistic insurance premium, waste, negative relation between ownership and
ﬁrm risk or all of these relations.
11Coeﬃcient estimates of female ownership and number of owners in largest family are highly insigniﬁcance
and thus excluded from the regressions.
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6 Robustness
The results presented above are robust to various ways of treating outliers. For example,
dropping observations of the insurance variable at 5% (on both sides of the distribution),
instead of 1%, or keeping outliers of the explanatory variables in the sample, see Appendix
A, does not alter the main ﬁndings of this paper.
Next, I address the high correlation between SALES and SIZE. Note that the correlation
between these two ﬁrm characteristics aﬀects only ﬁrst-stage estimates since only one of the
two variables appears in the three second-stage regressions. This, however, only raises the
hurdle for ﬁnding robust that is, signiﬁcant evidence for the various hedging theories
that are tested for in this paper. Moreover, when I exclude one of the highly correlated
variables in each of the three ﬁrst-stage regressions, I then obtain coeﬃcient estimates in
the second-stage which are almost identical to the reported results. Unsurprisingly, the
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates is slightly higher in this experiment when compared
with the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates in Table 4.
The exogenous variables in Tables 4 to 6 are obtained by using data for the ﬁscal year-end
prior to the start of the insurance contract. First, when the data from the ﬁscal year-end
after the insurance policy was initiated is used, similar results are obtained.
Second, I also construct an additional sample by using a standard practice in the risk
management literature: that is, selecting stock data from the ﬁnancial year before the in-
surance contract was initiated and ﬂow data from the same year as the insurance contract.
This speciﬁcation assumes that management relies on past stock data but has good estimates
available for current ﬂow data. Gezcy et al. (1997), for example, use this procedure. Overall,
I ﬁnd that the qualitative results are unaﬀected by changes in the matching and selection
criteria between the insurance data and the exogenous variables.
Third, the main results also hold if the three-year moving average is used instead of the
lagged values for the exogenous variables, or if, alternatively, all variables are averaged across
all years for which insurance data is available, resulting in a purely cross-sectional model.
18
Fourth, since there is substantial time-series dependence in the explanatory variables, it
is desirable to incorporate this feature of the data into the empirical analysis. Furthermore,
all ﬁrm policies, including insurance use, should depend on forecasted ﬁrm characteristics
rather than on prior or current values. To address these concerns, I predict explanatory
variables12 such as ﬁrm size from an ARMA(1,1) model which is ﬁtted to the time-series
of each accounting variable. Although employing predicted explanatory variables is more
consistent with the notion that ﬁrms have well ﬂeshed-out business plans, at least for the
near future, it appears that predicted ﬁrm characteristics do not outperform lagged balance-
sheet-based ﬁrm characteristics. One obvious reason predictions perform slightly worse than
lagged data is that the prediction itself produces outliers.
To show that the sample is representative, I compare the descriptive statistics of the data
to all CCGR data for the relevant years. The ﬁrms in the Aon Grieg database show somewhat
higher sales and size than the average Norwegian non-listed ﬁrm. This is, of course, not
surprising since smaller ﬁrms do not require an insurance broker. Another notable diﬀerence
between the sample of ﬁrms in the study and the population is that sales growth is lower for
ﬁrms in this study than in the population, and yet, the median sales growth in my sample
and the population are comparable. I, therefore, suspect that the diﬀerence is due to a few
ﬁrms with stellar sales growth in the population group: these ﬁrms may be too small for an
insurance broker and, thus, should not be in my database. Overall, I ﬁnd that the ﬁrms in
my sample do not diﬀer in an economically signiﬁcant way from the population of non-listed
ﬁrms in Norway.
Finally, I re-estimate the models in Tables 4 to 6, but include the CEO ownership variable
and ﬁll in missing CEO ownership data with zeros.13 One among the reasons why CEO
ownership data is missing is the possibility that CEO ownership is too small to be recorded.
12To my knowledge, Graham (1996) is the ﬁrst work that produces predicted data, namely corporate
marginal tax rates, in the empirical corporate ﬁnance literature.
13I have, in addition, hand-collected CEO ownership data via a questionnaire and replaced missing data
with zero when industrial ownership equals 100 percent. Nevertheless, the models in Tables 4 to 6 cannot
be identiﬁed when the original CEO ownership data are included.
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I, therefore, ﬁnd it plausible to replace missing data with zero. The results in Tables 4 to
6 are practically unchanged and CEO ownership shows a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient,
which is consistent with the results presented in Section 4.
7 Conclusions
I study corporate risk management with property insurance in non-listed small and medium-
sized ﬁrms. This is important because owners, including the CEO, of small and medium-sized
ﬁrms have, in general, tied their wealth to the ﬁrm. Therefore, it is expected that the risk
management motives of owners and managers are much more aligned in small and medium-
sized ﬁrms than in large public companies. In addition, family ﬁrms stress survival and,
thus, need to rely on risk management.
I document negative relations between the following ownership variables: CEO salary,
ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and between insurance use. I also
document a positive relation between the number of family owners and insurance use. These
relations are inconsistent with the risk aversion motive to hedge. However, the relations are
consistent with self-insurance among CEO-controlled ﬁrms, ﬁrms with high ownership con-
centrations, ﬁrms with above average female owners and ﬁrms with a small number of family
owners, given monopolistic insurance premiums. I provide empirical evidence that supports
this view by showing that insurers raise property insurance premiums for ﬁrms that experi-
ence increases in proﬁts. The above relations are also consistent with stakeholders stipulating
less insurance the higher the CEO salary or the higher the ownership concentration. This
may be because these ﬁrm characteristics proxy for below average ﬁrm risk. I also provide
empirical evidence that supports this view by establishing that ownership variables and the
coeﬃcient of variation of revenues are negatively related.
Moreover, I analyze insurance, capital structure, and liquidity choices jointly by employ-
ing simultaneous-equation regressions. This is an important matter because insurance, as
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well as liquidity, may allow ﬁrms to increase debt capacity. The results suggest that non-
listed ﬁrms insure to increase their debt capacity. The results also suggest that insurance
and liquidity, both forms of risk management, are complements. Although insurance and
liquidity are complements, ﬁrms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity. I ﬁnd that
long-term debt and liquidity behave as substitutes.
21
A Data Description
This appendix contains details about the construction of the variables employed in this
study. All reported regressions are performed with prior period data. Regression output
with a mixture of prior period and current period data (see Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)
and Gezcy et al. (1997)), current data and data with predicted explanatory variables are
available upon request.
A.1 Insurance Data
The data from Aon Grieg are insurance property premiums. The ﬁle contains the ﬁrm name,
gross premium, net premium, and a few other items. The insurance data are merged with the
accounting data by matching with the ﬁrm name. Firms that cannot be uniquely identiﬁed
are removed.
A.2 Explanatory Variables
Item numbers are CCGR variable deﬁnitions.
ASSETS: Assets is the sum of current asset and ﬁxed asset. Item 78 + Item 63
CASH: CASH is cash and equivalents divided by assets. (Item 75 + Item 76) / Assets
CEOSALARY: CEO is the CEO salary divided by assets multiplied by 1000. Item 114
/ Assets * 1000
CEOSHARE: CEOSHARE is shares owned by the CEO divided by 100. Item 13601 /
100
CEOSHARE2: CEOSHARE2 is shares owned by the CEO divided by 100. Missing
data is replaced by zero. Item 13601 / 100
CONCENTRATION: Concentration is the Herﬁndahl index for ownership. Item 225
DIV: DIV is the dividend yield ratio; usually it is calculated as dividends per share to
stock price at the end of the year. However, since we do not observe the stock price, it is
given here by total paid-out dividends scaled by total equity. Item 105 / Item 87
FAMILYSIZE: FAMILYSIZE is the number of family owners of the largest family.
FEMALE: FEMALE is aggregate female ownership divided by 100. Item 221 / 100
INSTOWN: INSTOWN is shares owned by institutional investors divided by 100. Item
218 / 100
LTD: LTD is the long-term debt ratio, which is given by the book value of long-term
debt divided by total Assets. Item 98 / Assets
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ROA: ROA is the return on assets; it is calculated as the operating earnings divided by
assets. Item 19 / Assets
SALES GROWTH: SALES GROWTH is the three-year backward-moving average
percentage growth in sales. Missing values are not propagated, which means that the average
may be calculated over less than three observations. Item 9 (sales revenue) has a total of
7,710 non-missing values for the whole sample (1994-2005); out of these, in 2,991 cases, Item
9 is equal to 0. When zero sales occur at the beginning or at the end of the sample period,
I use the original data; otherwise, zero sales are replaced by values obtained by means of
linear interpolation of surrounding non-zero values (the series thus created is named Item
9i, and is also used in constructing the OPEX and SALES variables). This transformation
aims to correct what seem to be typing mistakes while it also does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the results.
SIZE: Size is the logarithm of total assets. Log(Item 63 + Item 78)
INTANGASSETS: INTANGASSETS is intangible assets scaled by total assets. Item
46 / Assets
OPEX: OPEX is operating expenses scaled by sales, with the sales series transformed
as explained under SALES GROWTH above. (Item 12 + Item 13 + Item 14 + Item 15 +
Item 16 + Item 17 + Item 18)/Item 9i
PP&E: PP&E is property, plant, and equipment as a percentage of total assets. Item
51 / Assets
SALES: SALES is the logarithm of sales revenue, with the sales series transformed as
explained under SALES GROWTH above. log(Item 9i)
A.3 Outliers
The insurance ratio (INSURANCE) presents outliers and I therefore remove data below 1
percent values and above 99 percent values. Moreover, because of the small sample, for the
explanatory variables, it is more convenient to remove outliers individually for each series,
as follows:
CASH: I eliminate the 6 cases in which CASH is higher than 1.
DIV: I allow the dividend-to-equity ratio to be less than 4, removing a total of 18
observations.
INTANGASSETS: Negative intangible assets are removed.
LTD: I eliminate the 16 observations for which LTD is larger than 3. Cases with long-
term debt ratio higher than 1 (but lower than 3) are kept in the sample, in order to capture
the eﬀects of severe ﬁnancial distress.
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OPEX: I remove operating expenses to sales ratio at 99 percent. In addition, cases with
negative operating expenses are set to missing.
ROA: I remove one observation with an ROA of -28.
SALES GROWTH: Observations for which the percentage growth in sales in a given
year is higher than 10 (1000 percent) are eliminated. This reduces the number of observations
of the SALES GROWTH variable by one percent.
B Sign Predictions
This appendix contains the predictions for the variables used in the study.
B.1 Insurance equation
Sign predictions for the insurance equation are as follows:
CEOSALARY: positive inﬂuence (risk aversion motive).
DIV: negative inﬂuence.
FAMILYSIZE: negative inﬂuence (risk aversion motive).
FEMALE: positive inﬂuence (risk aversion motive).
INSTOWN: negative inﬂuence.
CEOSHARE: positive inﬂuence (risk aversion motive).




SALES GROWTH: positive inﬂuence.
SIZE: negative inﬂuence.
B.2 LTD equation
Sign predictions for the LTD equation are as follows:
CASH: variable is not included in LTD regressions in Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)
and Graham and Rogers (2002).
INSURANCE: positive inﬂuence, see Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008).
SALES GROWTH: negative inﬂuence, see Graham and Rogers (2002).
INTANGASSETS: positive inﬂuence, see Graham and Rogers (2002).
OPEX: no prediction.
SALES: negative inﬂuence, see Graham and Rogers (2002).
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PP&E: positive inﬂuence, see Graham and Rogers (2002).
B.3 CASH equation
Sign predictions for the CASH equation are as follows:
DIV: negative inﬂuence dividend dummy variable, see Bates et al. (2008).
LTD: negative inﬂuence, see Bates et al. (2008).
INSURANCE: no prediction.
SALES GROWTH: positive inﬂuence, see Bates et al. (2008).
C Time Series Forecasts
Time series forecasts are performed for the accounting time series employed as exogenous
variables. I use ﬁtted values for an ARMA(1,1) model, with a constant estimated for each
ﬁrm. This avoids endogeneity problems that arise when using current values, and is more
reﬁned than using simple lags.
I produce two additional versions of the ARMA(1,1) model forecasts. First, when the
forecasts are lower than the minimum of the actual time-series or when the forecasts are
higher than the maximum of the actual time-series, then these observations are assumed to
be missing. Second, when the forecasts are lower than the minimum of the actual time-series
or when the forecasts are higher than the maximum of the actual time-series, then these
forecasts are replaced with the minimum or maximum of the actual series.
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Table 1: Insurance Data. The table summarizes descriptive statistics of property insur-
ance premium for 933 non-listed Norwegian ﬁrms. The sample consists of 1855 ﬁrm-year
observations (All ﬁrms); 993 ﬁrm-year observations (Firms with positive long-term debt);
and 738 ﬁrm-year observations (Firms with zero long-term debt) ranging from January, 2003
through May, 2006. The premium is the annual insurance premium in Norwegian Kroner
(NOK). The insurance ratio is premium scaled by property, plant and equipment plus in-
ventory (PP&E +I in NOK). Insurance data are from AON Grieg Norway. Accounting data
are from CreditInform and my own calculations.
 
 
        
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max 
All firms       
Premium in NOK 1855 192432.00 732789.80 164.00 45848.00 15281813.00 
Insurance ratio 1618 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.01 1.69 
Premium to dividends 347 0.16 1.20 0.00 0.01 20.94 
Premium to earnings 1458 0.07 1.23 0.00 0.00 45.09 
(PP&E + I) / Assets 1732 0.33 0.29 0.00 0.27 1.00 
       
Firms with positive long-term debt      
Premium in NOK 993 242512.60 817263.50 164.00 68770.00 13654878.00 
Insurance ratio 946 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.69 
Premium to dividends 192 0.11 0.47 0.00 0.02 5.88 
Premium to earnings 810 0.09 1.62 0.00 0.00 45.09 
(PP&E + I) / Assets 993 0.41 0.30 0.00 0.42 1.00 
       
Firms with zero long-tern debt      
Premium in NOK 738 127210.70 643418.00 211.00 29240.50 15281813.00 
Insurance ratio 672 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.01 1.50 
Premium to dividends 155 0.22 1.72 0.00 0.01 20.94 
Premium to earnings 645 0.04 0.39 0.00 0.00 7.60 
(PP&E + I) / Assets 738 0.22 0.24 0.00 0.13 0.99 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Simultaneous Analysis of Debt Ratio, Insurance Ratio, and Liquidity
I This table reports linear GMM coeﬃcient estimates from a simultaneous equation model
for debt (LTD), for insurance (INSURANCE) and for liquidity (CASH), with a total of 663
ﬁrm-year observations with non-zero LTD. The p-values are heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent. CASH is cash and equivalents divided by assets. CEOSAL is the CEO
salary divided by assets times 1000. CONCENTRATION is the Herﬁndahl index of equity
ownership. DIV is dividends scaled by total equity. FEMALE is aggregate female ownership
divided by 100. INSTOWN is institutional ownership divided by 100. INSURANCE is the
insurance premium over property, plant and equipment plus inventories. INTANGASSETS
is intangible assets scaled by total assets. LTD stands for book value of long-term debt di-
vided by assets. OPEX is operating expenses scaled by sales. PP&E is property, plant, and
equipment as a percentage of assets. ROA is the return on assets (operating earnings over
assets). SALES is the logarithm of sales. SALESGROWTH is the three-year moving average
percentage growth in sales. SIZE is the logarithm of assets. Industry dummie variables are
as in Table 2. The superscript (*) denotes endogenous variables. The endogenous variables
are measured as of ﬁscal year-ends after the starting date of the insurance contract, (-1).





  INSURANCE  LTD  CASH 
Variable  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob. 
         
Constant -0.0190 0.63  0.2718 0.04  0.0919 0.00 
CASH* 1.1285 0.00  -0.2718 0.06    
CEOSAL(-1) -0.3071 0.03       
CONCENTRATION(-1) -0.0206 0.03       
DIV(-1) -0.0552 0.00     0.0609 0.00 
FEMALE(-1) -0.0833 0.01       
INSTOWN(-1) -0.1262 0.22       
INSURANCE*    3.6656 0.00  0.5009 0.00 
INTANGASSETS(-1)    0.5380 0.00    
LTD* 0.1463 0.00     -0.1655 0.00 
OPEX(-1)    -0.0104 0.29    
PPE(-1)    0.5182 0.00    
ROA(-1) -0.0821 0.01       
SALES(-1)    -0.0100 0.14    
SALESGROWTH(-1) -0.0295 0.00  0.0454 0.03  0.0264 0.01 
SIZE(-1) -0.0018 0.32       
Dummy variables         
Industry dummies Y  Y  Y 
Year dummies Y  Y  Y 
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Table 5: Simultaneous Analysis of Debt Ratio, Insurance Ratio, and Liquidity
II This table reports linear GMM coeﬃcient estimates from a simultaneous equation model
for debt (LTD), for insurance (INSURANCE) and for liquidity (CASH), with a total of 663
ﬁrm-year observations with non-zero LTD. The p-values are heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent. CASH is cash and equivalents divided by assets. CEOSAL is the CEO
salary divided by assets times 1000. CONCENTRATION is the Herﬁndahl index of equity
ownership. DIV is dividends scaled by total equity. FEMALE is aggregate female ownership
divided by 100. INSTOWN is institutional ownership divided by 100. INSURANCE is the
insurance premium over property, plant and equipment plus inventories. INTANGASSETS
is intangible assets scaled by total assets. LTD stands for book value of long-term debt di-
vided by assets. OPEX is operating expenses scaled by sales. PP&E is property, plant, and
equipment as a percentage of assets. ROA is the return on assets (operating earnings over
assets). SALES is the logarithm of sales. SALESGROWTH is the three-year moving average
percentage growth in sales. SIZE is the logarithm of assets. Industry dummie variables are
as in Table 2. The superscript (*) denotes endogenous variables. The endogenous variables
are measured as of ﬁscal year-ends after the starting date of the insurance contract, (-1).





  INSURANCE  LTD  CASH 
Variable  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob. 
         
Constant -0.0193 0.65  0.2786 0.04  0.0675 0.00 
CASH* 1.0769 0.00  -0.5094 0.06    
CEOSAL(-1) -0.1959 0.21       
CONCENTRATION(-1) -0.0436 0.03  0.0313 0.34  0.0293 0.11 
DIV(-1) -0.0515 0.00     0.0571 0.00 
FEMALE(-1) -0.1903 0.00  0.1828 0.01  0.1905 0.00 
INSTOWN(-1) -0.1473 0.14       
INSURANCE*    3.6464 0.00  0.5681 0.00 
INTANGASSETS(-1)    0.5060 0.00    
LTD* 0.1551 0.00     -0.1724 0.00 
OPEX(-1)    -0.0068 0.46    
PPE(-1)    0.4967 0.00    
ROA(-1) -0.0689 0.02       
SALES(-1)    -0.0106 0.11    
SALESGROWTH(-1) -0.0297 0.00  0.0535 0.01  0.0270 0.01 
SIZE(-1) -0.0009 0.64       
Dummy variables         
Industry dummies Y  Y  Y 
Year dummies Y  Y  Y 
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Table 6: Simultaneous Analysis of Debt Ratio, Insurance Ratio, and Liquidity III
This table reports linear GMM coeﬃcient estimates from a simultaneous equation model
for debt (LTD), for insurance (INSURANCE) and for liquidity (CASH), with a total of 526
ﬁrm-year observations with zero and non-zero LTD. The p-values are heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent. CASH is cash and equivalents divided by assets. CEOSAL is
the CEO salary divided by assets times 1000. CONCENTRATION is the Herﬁndahl index
of equity ownership. DIV is dividends scaled by total equity. FAMILYSIZE is the number
of family owners of largest family. FEMALE is aggregate female ownership divided by 100.
INSURANCE is the insurance premium over property, plant and equipment plus invento-
ries. INTANGASSETS is intangible assets scaled by total assets. LTD stands for book value
of long-term debt divided by assets. OPEX is operating expenses scaled by sales. PP&E
is property, plant, and equipment as a percentage of assets. ROA is the return on assets
(operating earnings over assets). SALES is the logarithm of sales. SALESGROWTH is
the three-year moving average percentage growth in sales. SIZE is the logarithm of assets.
Industry dummie variables are as in Table 2. The superscript (*) denotes endogenous vari-
ables. The endogenous variables are measured as of ﬁscal year-ends after the starting date
of the insurance contract, (-1). Insurance data are from AON Grieg Norway. Accounting




  INSURANCE  LTD  CASH 
Variable  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob. 
         
Constant -0.6951 0.02  -0.3046 0.41  0.1331 0.00 
CASH* 2.2285 0.00  -0.7958 0.00    
CEOSAL(-1) -0.5007 0.00       
CONCENTRATION(-1) 0.0106 0.22       
DIV(-1) -0.0722 0.00     0.0415 0.00 
FAMILYSIZE 0.0199 0.01  -0.0111 0.24  -0.0094 0.04 
FEMALE(-1) -0.2603 0.00  0.2740 0.00  0.1737 0.00 
INSURANCE*    3.6174 0.00  0.4028 0.09 
INTANGASSETS(-1)    0.4662 0.00    
LTD* 0.2566 0.01     -0.1512 0.00 
OPEX(-1)    -0.0143 0.21    
PPE(-1)    0.7709 0.00    
ROA(-1) -0.2393 0.00       
SALES(-1)    0.0216 0.22    
SALESGROWTH(-1) -0.0154 0.03  -0.0040 0.83  0.0126 0.19 
SIZE(-1) 0.0227 0.02       
Dummy variables         
Industry dummies Y  Y  Y 
Year dummies Y  Y  Y 
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Table 7: Insurance Premium and Proﬁtability  Firm Risk and Ownership Struc-
ture Panel A reports coeﬃcient estimates from three diﬀerence in diﬀerence models for
changes in property insurance premium. The premium is the annual insurance premium in
Norwegian Kroner (NOK). Proﬁts is results from operations. PP&E +I (NOK) is property,
plant and equipment plus inventory. Panel B reports coeﬃcient estimates for variations in
revenues. CVAR REVENUES is the coeﬃcient of variations of revenues. MEANCEOSAL
is the ﬁrm mean of CEO salary. MEANCONCENTRATION is the ﬁrm mean of ownership
concentration. MEANINSTOWN is the ﬁrm mean of institutional ownership. Insurance





  Panel A 
  ∆ ln(Premium)  ∆ ln(Premium)  ∆ ln(Premium) 
Variable  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob. 
         
Constant 2.5746 0.07  4.4417 0.01  0. 2088 0.94 
∆ Profits 0. 4809 0.00     0.4589 0.01 
∆ Profits(-1)    0.5672 0.01  0.2751 0.06 
∆ (PP&E + I) -0. 0001 0.28     -0.0001 0.07 
∆ (PP&E + I)(-1)    0.0003 0.02  0.0003 0.03 
Dummy variables         
Industry dummies Y  Y  Y 
Year dummies Y  Y  Y 
N. of OBSERVATIONS 230  212  110 
Adj R-squared 0.30  0.35  0.39 
      
 Panel B 
 CVAR REVENUES  CVAR REVENUES  CVAR REVENUES 
 Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob. 
         
Constant 1.0229 0.00  1.0102 0.00  1.4236 0.00 
MEANCEOSAL -0.3996 0.18  -0.4405 0.13    
MEANCONCENTRATION       -0.5011 0.00 
Dummy variables         
Industry dummies N  Y  N 
N. of OBSERVATIONS 851  848  859 
Adj R-squared 0.00  0.10  0.04 
         
Constant 1.3617 0.00  1.0225 0.00  1.0613 0.00 
MEANCONCENTRATION -0.3844 0.00       
MEANINSTOWN    0.1305 0.74  0.0751 0.84 
Dummy variables         
Industry dummies Y  N  Y 
N. of OBSERVATIONS 856  859  856 
Adj R-squared 0.12  0.00  0.10 
         
Constant 1.3937 0.00       
MEANCEOSAL -0.4433 0.13       
MEANCONCENTRATION -0.4115 0.00       
MEANINSTOWN -0.4170 0.25       
Dummy variables         
Industry dummies Y       
N. of OBSERVATIONS 840       
Adj R-squared 0.12       
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